In the northern Iraqi town of Kirkuk today, hundreds of Kurds, Turkomen, Shia and Sunni Arabs marched together in solidarity. At a time when Iraq's bloody sectarian divisions dominate the headlines, this joint protest was a rare, almost nostalgic act of unity. The demonstrators rejected the decree of the government's "Committee for Normalisation" that would remove any Arabs in Kirkuk who moved there during Baathist rule in Iraq. Chants rung out supporting the inherent unity of Iraq; placards opposed the partition of the country.
The spirit of the protest would have pleased Ali A. Allawi were he there and not in snow-dusted London to impress a gathering of journalists and pedigreed academics. The special adviser to the Iraqi prime minister (and former defence and trade minister himself) noted that in the past, politics in Iraq - and in the rest of the middle east - were "never couched in sectarian terms". It was only the ill-considered invasion of Iraq in 2003 that unleashed Shia and Sunni animosity as we know it now. Now, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's beleaguered government must struggle to preserve Iraq's brittle integrity.
Measured and pragmatic, Allawi accepted that al-Maliki may not have done enough to crack down on the Mahdi Army - the militia of firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr who has been accused by US officials of colluding with Iranian agents - but was quick to point out that the Badr Brigade - the armed wing of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Shia organisation that enjoys the Bush administration's support - is much more tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guard than any faction of the Mahdi Army. Allawi was incredulous that US officials would throw in their lot with SCIRI, as its leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim returns this week from a friendly trip to Tehran.
At once a benefactor (he returned to Iraq from exile in 2003 and was minister for trade and defence minister in the interim governments) and critic of US policies, Allawi seemed more puzzled than angry with the Bush administration's handling of Iraq. The toppling of Saddam had indeed allowed the development of a "form of democratic politics" that could, in the future, "set the stage for the next phase of middle eastern modernity". Yet, the "incredibly poor performance of the US in managing Iraq" continued to complicate matters.
It was the brain, and not just the brawn, of American huff-and-puff that fell short of requirements. The US failed to predict the rapid Shia ascendancy in Iraq and the subsequent alienation of the Sunni. American forces still used "inappropriate counterinsurgency methods", doing more harm than good. And the ongoing crisis in Iraq had destabilised the entire region. "Very few American decisions have had positive effects," Allawi summed up dryly.
The Iraqi politician fears any American attack on Iran would further devastate the region. He insists that the vast majority of Iraqi politicians oppose military action against their neighbour and erstwhile foe. Instead, middle eastern countries must work together to forge regional pacts that guarantee civil majority-minority rights. Iraq, itself, must arrive at a decentralised federal system where power is portioned not just equally, but with an eye to maintaining the whole. One wonders if anybody in Washington is listening.