The French newspaper Le Monde put it best: No other European country has rejected war as Spain did. From the very beginning of the crisis over Iraq, the polls were extremely consistent: up to 91% of the public strongly rejected the war. Of course the Spanish government was aware of this, and tried in different ways to neutralise its possible and probable consequences not least because of the approach of three major elections in the next year.
Spain and the United States: an unforgiving history
The question, in Spain and abroad, is why did the government of Jose Maria Aznar resist this tide of opinion and join the United States-led coalition of the willing which waged war on the Iraqi regime? After all, Spain has a long tradition of suspicion towards US foreign policy. This attitude is deeply rooted in its political culture, going back to the end of the 19th century to the conflicts over Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines.
Indeed, the way the US started the Cuba war in 1898 is often cited these days as an example of fake arguments to justify a war with a hidden agenda. From the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine and the claim to be liberating the Cuban people from colonial tyranny to the establishment of a military US protectorate and the part played by a supine media in justifying the whole operation Spanish opinion has had a feeling of history repeating itself.
The scepticism towards US foreign policy is reinforced by memories of American support for Francos dictatorship across three decades until his death in 1975. There is no equivalent memory of GIs landing on Omaha beach on D-day in 1944 for purposes of liberation. Between 1945 and 1975 (when Franco died), our perception has always been that US foreign policy cared nothing for Spanish democracy and the Spanish people.
In February 1981, members of the paramilitary Civil Guard stormed the Cortes (parliament) in Madrid. Spains young democracy was threatened with a return to brutal military rule. The crisis was solved internally, by the strong, dignified response of civil society, political parties, democratic institutions, and King Juan Carlos. But no one here forgets the words of Alexander Haig, US secretary of state under Ronald Reagan, to the press during the hours of uncertainty, when Spains democracy hung in the balance: No comment, this is an internal matter for Spain.
The years of Adolfo Suarezs and Felipe Gonzalezs premierships in the two decades after 1977 helped to consolidate and stabilise Spanish democracy. Now, the Iraq war and Aznars attitude to it in particular have been the catalyst of a growing reaction against a Partido Popular government which promised in 1996 to govern from the centre but has in fact been shifting towards extremely conservative policies and style. The matter of style is itself significant in a country where the right-wing has been always late at the appointment with democracy. This makes Aznars support for the war all the more unsettling to his people. A smart journalist has even found an article written in 1979, in which a certain (young) Jose Maria Aznar took a very reluctant stand towards the new democratic constitution, approved as recently as December 1978.
An accumulation of crises
The Spanish peoples opposition to its governments policy on Iraq is the latest in a series of crises triggering a growing social response. In 2002 alone, three major protest movements took to the streets.
The first crisis of 2002 was against proposed educational reforms. To some extent, this could be considered only the typical protest of a traditionally activist social sector: educationalists, students, academic staff. Indeed it was seen in this light, as a minor problem, by the government (even though the minister of education, Pilar del Castillo, was in the early 1970s a courageous militant of a communist group).
The second crisis dates from June 2002, when trade unions called for a general strike against a hardline reform of employment law, retirements and some basic social rights. This was seen as an assault on the social dimension of Spains democratic system, which goes back only to 1978. It is thus historically a very recent achievement, and greatly cherished by people.
This crisis was deeply revealing politically. Spain is not a country which resorts frivolously to a general strike. There have been a few in the last twenty-five years, the major one in 1988 against the socialist government headed by Felipe Gonzalez. As in all earlier cases, the strike this time was a success, with the government backing down by simply dropping the proposed reform.
But the style with which the government characterised the strike, the union leaders and workers, the media coverage and the absence of any serious parliamentary debate, caused ructions in the government and led to Aznars first major reshuffle of ministers.
The third crisis was the sinking of the oil tanker Prestige not far from the Galician coast, an environmental and social disaster which the Spanish government responded to in a wholly inept and insensitive way. The immediate reaction to the tragedy had two aspects: it was massive in scale, indeed nationwide, and it was a social response rather than a politically-organised one. Aznars mismanagement of the crisis (and of its media presentation) provoked a sense of revolt unprecedented in Spain since his Partido Popular came to power in 1996.
This series of crises meant that the Iraq war arrived at a bad moment for the Spanish government. Even more seriously, it came in the run-up to three important elections. Before the end of May 2003, municipal and regional elections are held in thirteen of Spains regions; in October, there are regional elections in Catalonia; and in spring 2004, there are general elections, in which Jose Maria Aznar promised at the time of his last victory (in 2000) not to contest.
Indeed, according to some experts, Aznars decision not to run again for prime minister may in part explain his strong support of the war on Iraq against the wishes of the country he has nothing now to lose. But even if Aznar keeps his promise (which is not inevitable), it also leaves his three major potential successors Jaime Mayor, Rodrigo Rato, and Mariano Rajoy in a difficult position.
Spains foreign policy in uncharted waters
In any case, the most bizarre element of Aznars position on the war is that it is very far from modern Spanish tradition in fact his wilful personal decision to support the invasion of Iraq directly overturns not only earlier Spanish foreign policy under democracy, but also the tradition of his own conservatives.
The Spanish right has traditionally been isolationist, only reluctantly European and pro-Arab. Under the post-1977 democratic system, the centre (under Adolfo Suarez) and the left (under the prolonged government of Felipe Gonzalez) were each preoccupied with maintaining a consensual approach to foreign policy. Europe was its backbone, but substantial efforts were invested in the transatlantic link (epitomised by Gonzalezs support for Nato membership in the referendum of 1986), as well as in a mediating capacity in both the Middle East (reflected in the efforts of the EU envoy and Spanish ambassador, Miguel Angel Moratinos) and Latin America.
Aznars breach of this continuity in particular his total and unconditional adherence to the George W. Bush view of the world is, so far, incomprehensible to Spanish opinion. Any logic it possesses may lie in a quasi-sophisticated strategy whereby Spain will receive the putatively great benefits of US support against terrorism.
But the inclusion of the recently-banned Basque party Batasuna on the US state departments list of terrorist groups is deeply unconvincing evidence of this alleged support. The fight against terrorism in Spain still depends largely on the old Europe methods of police and judicial cooperation with France (as the recent arrest in southern France of four top leaders of the Basque terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Eta) proves). This cooperation is equally valuable at an EU level, again proven by the neutering of several al-Qaida cells in the last eighteen months.
Jose Maria Aznar, in short, seems to be opening himself to something worse in politics than mere opposition: ridicule.
It remains true that peoples social memory can be volatile and citizens political memory can be short. The Spanish government is surely betting on that being the case when the coming election days arrive. We will see.