Read Theo Veenkamps call for pragmatism, firmness, and imagination in European migration policy as he responds to contributors to the People Flow debate on openDemocracy
The multiple migration flow management that we are developing in our thought experiment is no less vulnerable than the existing approaches to migration control. Its main advantage, we believe, is that it systematically tries to capitalise on the constructive forces and energies within migration movements in a way that could be beneficial to the migrants themselves, and to both the receiving and sending countries.
Its vulnerability becomes evident mainly in questions like the following:
- In placing primary reliance on self-regulating networks facilitating and restricting voluntary international mobility, are you not creating new security risks?
- In view of the overall increase in international mobility that we can expect in the coming decades, are there no limits to the absorption capacity of the European Mobility Service points (EMSPs)?
- Wont attractive International Transit Centres (ITCs) function as magnets, collapsing under their own success, and in the end produce only more frustration?
- Can ITCs, however smooth-running, ever compete with the magic pull of an EU-member state passport and the social welfare to which it gives access ?
- If we leave room for multiple loyalties, doesnt peaceful co-existence remain a rather fragile foundation for our societies?
All these questions have indeed been raised, either in the pages of openDemocracy or elsewhere. In our thought exercise we have been very keen in acknowledging these and other vulnerabilities and in being as precise as we could about the nature of the underlying complications.

However, these complications, serious as they are, have not prompted us to abandon our thought exercise. For us the key question remains: which complications do we in the end prefer, the ones resulting from a continuation of defensive migration control or those resulting from constructive multiple flow management? Our clear choice for the second set of complications has made it necessary to widen the scope of the thought exercise so that we may imagine a way for dealing with these complications.
People flow in its wider context
We have concluded that multiple flow management as we were developing it could never become really sustainable if it were not embedded in surrounding systems of governance, wealth creation and social welfare that reinforce and complement the innovations underlying the multiple flow management approach.
This important conclusion triggered the flash of insight that continued migration pressure on western Europe, small as it will remain when seen on a global scale, nevertheless can be recognised for what it is and used as such a powerful sign on the wall telling us that it is time for a second round of societal innovation in the foundations for western Europes post-war security and wealth: including the Nato security umbrella, the common market and national welfare states, and the EU itself.
For various reasons, the stability and future form of each of these institutional arrangements is now widely accepted as uncertain, and subject to intense debate. But the external pressure applied by migration reveals an additional weakness: as cornerstones of European governance and prosperity, each was constructed in an inward-looking, exclusive manner, not designed to absorb new flows of people easily or to bridge the gap with former European colonies.
All this led us to a fascinating phase in our thought exercise, where we were obliged to explore the different ways in which Europe might evolve to become stronger, better connected with the rest of the world, and more able to turn the perceived threat of mass migration into an opportunity, in the process helping to stimulate our collective imagination about what Europe could become, say, over the next half century.
Europes future: three strategic options
Some details of what was explored under this heading can be found in openDemocracys summary and of course more extensively in the report itself. In order to advance this debate, I will try to bring out here the essence of the major strategic new options that we identified, which we think deserve further scrutiny and testing.
The first strategic option concerns the overall pattern of governance in the wider Europe. We think that the ongoing project of the European Union should be complemented with two equally important parallel projects:
- a redesign of the basis of authority of nation-states, which revisits national democracies and redefines the meaning of national citizenship
- an investment in stability, interdependence and shared interests for the wider region, through the creation of a European Commonwealth.
In addition, the EU project itself should incorporate the following aim:
- the creation of an EU-wide responsibility for sustainable European security a comprehensive and partially innovative vision to promote security on local, national and European levels, complemented by a commitment to contribute significantly and appropriately to global stability and security.
The second strategic option is to seriously explore the pros and cons of actively developing a new stage in European wealth creation, on the one hand by upgrading the informal sector as a welcome bridge between the economies of sending and receiving countries, and on the other hand by finding ways to reposition human resources not only as flexible but expendable instruments of wealth creation, but also as a source of economic wealth in its own right.
The third strategic option is to restructure the welfare state towards a facilitating state, based on the following four elements:
- Only those who are retired, disabled or permanently dependent on public care for other reasons should be guaranteed a minimum level of basic shelter, care and income.
- All others, when they either reach adulthood or become naturalised, should be entitled to a basic citizenship credit.
- This credit could be linked, on demand, to a range of personal development packages, services and opportunities, made available on a customised or personalised basis.
- Such an entitlement would be granted on the basis of a civil covenant setting out the rights and responsibilities of the creditor, and the range of options for repaying credit, which could include payment in kind, through certain kinds of work or other contributions.
The hope in Europes history
Why did we hit upon these sometimes rather far-fetched strategic options?
The three-tiered pattern of governance in a wider European region which makes up the first option, is basically an attempt to construct a new and more sustainable infrastructure for home, identity and security in an interdependent world on the move.
In one way, in such a world, the nation-state becomes even more important than it ever was as the indispensable constitutive ground for authority, democracy and citizenship. But this is within what Robert Cooper refers to as the framework of a new form of statehood. The real nature and characteristics of such a reshaped nation state are in many respects still unclear, but its defining test would be whether it could function effectively as an inspiring vessel for a new sense of home for all who feel the real loss of that which was so dear to them, newcomers and old-time residents alike.

Equally important is the start of a process that step-by-step creates an extending zone of positive interdependence and mutual understanding across and beyond the wider European region. We therefore propose the launching of a European Commonwealth process, underpinned by long-term support from the European Union and its member states, dedicated to a range of projects which would be led both by governments and by civil organisations. The overall purpose of these projects would be to extend peace and prosperity across the wider region, and encourage the positive reshaping of colonial legacies and relationships, with the aim of encouraging a more concerted joint investment in the evolution of democratic governance.
This framework would on the one hand rest on a much older definition of Europe, going back all the way to Mesopotamia. On the other, it would indeed translate its millennia-long, still unfolding, unstoppable and enriching diversity into a distinct new politics which reframed the very idea of Europe in terms of its empathy and engagement with the stranger (Ash Amin).
Over the generations, such a European Commonwealth process could create a common frame of reference: a shared sense of connectedness and history that would enable all sides concerned to deal in more constructive ways with the inevitable frictions which will continue to flare up from time to time in schools and on streets in one part or another of the wider multicultural European region (Nick Ryan), in no time at all acquiring additional heat through related frictions in schools and streets in another, sometimes far-away, part of that same European region.
Moreover, combining nation-states redesigned as undisputed sources of authority with an inspiring European Commonwealth process, can significantly help to better define the long-term ambition of the EU-project. In our view, one of the key long-term defining characteristics of the EU could well be its capacity to provide and create conditions for security in an innovative and multi-faceted way on all levels and in the wider region, in partnership with the US and others at the same time making optimal use of the various comparative advantages and specific skills that the EU has at its disposal. If such a project were successful, it could create widespread feelings of trust and security that would considerably facilitate constructive multiple people flow management.
Wealth creation and human capital

The second strategic option concerns one of the driving forces of international people flow: wealth creation. The underlying argument for this option flows, at root, directly from our departure point of viewing migration as a powerful sign of human vitality: moreover, as a valuable source of a priceless human energy.
Economic systems are currently structured in two ways which prevent the optimal use of these potentialities. In the first place, in many European countries the informal sector forms a key lever for wealth-creating, international (two-way) mobility that however has to partially operate in an illegal and second-rate context. Why not try to reposition this sector as a valuable and legal sector of the economy, thus strengthening its potential for mutually advantageous wealth creation? This would, in addition, contribute to more overall people flow transparency, in line with the principle of transparency which is also being promoted by effective European Mobility Service Points an important way of reducing one source of the related frictions.
We would like to see the second change we are proposing for our system for wealth creation thoroughly explored and scrutinised, since it is much more far-reaching. It basically entails addressing the question of human capital and its relationship with wealth creation in a new way. Might it become possible one day to view human resources as a source of economic wealth in their own right? If so, why not imagine the possible development of investment markets based on available human resources, in addition to those based on financial capital, material resources or technological capacity.
This has not occurred hitherto, partly because productivity increases from human or service-based activities can never be as great as those based on physical resources and production processes. But it should be possible for a macro-economic framework to contain two sets of legal, fiscal and financing support structures. Under this hypothetical framework, funds could be attracted to more than one kind of enterprise: shareholder-financed profit-driven companies, and stakeholder-financed, output-oriented ventures. Such an option reflects the many different forms of social investment and mutual ownership currently under experiment on a small scale across Europe, part of a long and rich tradition.

The significance of this possibility is that it offers a way to sustain a labour-intensive, socially important tier of activity within European economies that are simultaneously becoming more competitive and knowledge-intensive. As such, it could significantly reduce the strain of using taxation-financed welfare support systems to meet the costs of economic dislocation and marginalisation.
Furthermore, and at least as important for our argument, it could become a valuable addition to the economic toolbox, especially for economies that are poor in physical and abundant in human resources, where it could be used as a powerful instrument reducing the push of poverty-driven migration to countries that cannot themselves absorb such an influx economically.
From welfare to facilitating state
The third major strategic option we have outlined is at least as unorthodox as the second one. It concerns the role of the welfare state. The welfare state, in its different varieties, must be regarded as one the most valuable post-second world war western European societal innovations. At the same time, precisely this innovation has done much to send misleading signals about economic possibilities to potential migrants and has also significantly added to frictions between new arrivals and old-time residents.
Our argument is that if a fundamental redesign of the welfare state is in any case necessary, let us try to do it right from the beginning in a manner that takes the dynamics of international people flow into account. The hypothetical strategic option which we developed as a result the facilitating state implies an unequivocal farewell to the idea that the state will provide unconditional care for its citizens whenever they might need it. This is to be replaced by the message that giving nothing for free is a sign of respect for the potential capacities and responsibilities of citizens, whatever their personal circumanstances, as long as they are permitted to meet their obligations and contribute to wealth creation in ways that correspond to their own abilities.

One advantage of such a system would be that it would eliminate wide disparities in treatment between European citizens and the support availabe to displaced persons in International Transit Centres. The basic entitlement and the means of treatment would essentially be the same, although this does not preclude differences in the pricing of services or the range of provisions offered to different people in different places. Overall, such a system would emphasise equality of treatment where possible between old and new citizens, alongside the central principle of reciprocal obligation.
This kind of system would also provide important opportunities for investing in citizenship, for example by creating joint ceremonies on a Europe-wide Citizenship Day, both for 18-year-olds acquiring adult status and for naturalised citizens. Finally, the concept of the facilitating state could function as a beacon for national development and good governance. In many countries, it would already connect better with existing cultures and practices of reciprocity and shared responsibility than the magical but unrealistic notion of the caring and providing state.
Where do we go from here?
The real questions are twofold:
- Can our political and public policy processes find ways of addressing issues as broad, and as complex as these in ways that might generate credible solutions?
- Does Europe have sufficient capacity for research and development on challenging societal innovations of the type identified here, as compared with more traditional forms of technological and industrial change?
Why not use the second round of the openDemocracy debate about People Flow as one of the test sites for finding answers to these two questions? That would be a challenging experiment in itself, trying to move beyond the dynamics of contested exchange to include some elements of continuing dialogue. I hope therefore that the contributors to the next stage of debate will be willing to help us in our quest for a more constructive way of dealing with migration, by addressing one or more of the following questions:
- Are there major shortcomings in the main logic or the empirical foundations of our argument? If so, what are they?
- How can we improve the substantive content and the details of the various elements of the sketched multiple flow management approach, together with the three additional contextual strategic options? Can you help?
- What first steps or pilot projects might be helpful in positioning us in the right direction? For example:
- Should we start working on establishing a World Migration Organisation as Arthur C. Helton suggests? or
With the help of these three innovative long-term strategic options we have presented the outlines of a mid-21st century European economy and society that are necessarily broad and experimental. We have sought to show how the conditions needed for higher flows of people in and out of Europe to become sustainable and productive could be met through interconnected change in our economic, social and governance arrangements. It is not impossible to imagine that these kinds of changes could come about. They are no more radical than the transformations that have been achieved in western Europe over the last half century.
- Shift policy emphasis towards using the still relatively soft and more integrative meta-values of the EU as the primary vehicle for integration, as Achilles Skordas argues? or
- Start creating a new European narrative in Gibraltar as recommended by Inigo Garruchaga?
- Should we start working on establishing a World Migration Organisation as Arthur C. Helton suggests? or
With the help of these three innovative long-term strategic options we have presented the outlines of a mid-21st century European economy and society that are necessarily broad and experimental. We have sought to show how the conditions needed for higher flows of people in and out of Europe to become sustainable and productive could be met through interconnected change in our economic, social and governance arrangements. It is not impossible to imagine that these kinds of changes could come about. They are no more radical than the transformations that have been achieved in western Europe over the last half century.
- While acknowledging the need for new thinking on migration, what are the meaningful alternatives to the approach as suggested in People Flow?
- Should we look to Europes fear of immigration to join forces with the USs fear of terrorism to force a liberal, interventionist development policy which will improve the lot of the badly-governed just enough to keep immigration at an acceptable level, as Tony Curzon Price prophesied?