It is now two years since the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland launched a large-scale military intervention in Iraq. While the question of the wars legality or legitimacy was and still is bitterly contested, it was a short, sharp success in military terms. After it, the victorious coalition powers were in an extraordinarily strong position to help build a newly democratic, economically strong, stable Iraq. Unfortunately, the speed and efficiency of the combat phase of the operation has not been replicated in the subsequent reconstruction phase.
After thirty years of Saddam Husseins brutal dictatorship, turning Iraq into a viable democratic state was always going to require intensive work on three fronts: the political, the economic and the security. Each is dependent on the other. Reasonable security is needed for progress on reconstruction, and to allow the political process to advance. Improvements in the sustainability and quality of life are needed to reduce support for insurgency, and to engage people in the political process. Politics needs to work to reduce tensions and make the people feel that they have a stake in the future of their country.
Regrettably, the first year from the end of major combat in April 2003 was marked by strategic incompetence on a massive scale. The political timetable was continually changed. The reconstruction was put in the hands of US companies, which led to corruption and unemployment for Iraqis. Nor were Iraqis given any significant role in securing their country, and retraining of forces did not start until the middle of 2004. All of this meant that forces of anarchy and criminality were free to grow.
Four distinct groups now threaten Iraq. First, former regime elements, who are largely drawn from the Sunni population, and number somewhere between 15,000 and 30,000 fighters. There are then two different groups of Islamic extremists who can field suicide attacks. The foreign fighters, including those led by Musab al-Zarqawi, number about 1,000. A new development is the emergence of home-grown Islamist insurgents. They are still fewer than 500, but their numbers are increasing and they can deliver great destruction. Fourth, the biggest security problem of all comes from organised crime. At least twelve of Iraqs eighteen governorates have a major crime problem, particularly when the criminals work with the insurgents.
The armed forces of Britain and her allies now serving in Iraq face a difficult and challenging problem. There is now widespread agreement that the only way forward is to provide the training and equipment necessary for Iraqi security forces progressively to take over the responsibility for national security. The question is how to keep that process on track, while the trainees themselves have become ever more targeted. Iraqi officials and officers readily acknowledge that Iraqi forces still have a long way to go, that they still lack appropriate resources, and that transition through two new Iraqi governments in 2005 will create turbulence under the best of circumstances. Even if the course of the insurgency were predictable, Iraqi military and security developments are very much a matter of improvisation and uncertainty. Iraqi security authorities also have no clear budget for force planning, and no way to predict the level of coalition aid.
To make any impact on this dismal scenario would demand clear thinking by all concerned. Instead, there is a sense of rudderless drift. The US and the UK promise to stay as long as they are needed. Other allies Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy are making their excuses and leaving. There is the outline of a timetable. The constitution is to be agreed by 15 August 2005, a plebiscite would follow by 15 October and full democratic elections would be held by the end of the year. The process is allowed to slip just once, but only by six months if necessary. In parallel, all parties the Iraqis (once they have formed a transitional government) and the contributing nations alike need to sit together and agree a timetable for the transfer of security responsibility from the multinational force to the Iraqi national forces. This might keep the wavering allies aboard, and give Iraqis a sense of urgency.
Planning can only be done on a joint basis between all those involved, otherwise we will find British and American forces in place for years to come, with an endless insurgency that may lead to the break-up of Iraq. Two further elements are needed: full objective data on progress, and financial transparency. Without reliable statistics, it will continue to be impossible to know whether the strategy is working. Without financial accountability, corruption will undermine all other advances.
A concerted international effort that followed this approach could bring a fragile, but improving, situation in Iraq with the hope that coalition forces might leave by the end of 2006. The alternative is a country which begins to look more like Afghanistan than Vietnam, with increasingly lawless regions. The prospect for coalition forces is then without limit, as the worst route of all would be to abandon Iraq and allow it to become a force for instability in the region.