When Osama Bin Laden put the Palestinian cause at the core of the speech he delivered to the world, released immediately after the outbreak of American and British hostilities against Afghanistan, he was deliberately attempting to draw legitimacy from the Muslim and Arab public by linking his cause to that of Palestinians and exploiting their frustration. One can extrapolate that the Palestinian cause is the most legitimate and credible in the region.
Iraqi precedent, Afghan difference
Even United States President George Bush and the American administration seem to feel that they must do something in support of the Palestinian people and cause if they want to succeed in ensuring Arab backing for an anti-terrorism coalition. Ten years ago, when the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was facing an offensive from the American-led coalition, he also linked his cause with that of Palestinians, saying he would end his occupation of Kuwait only when Israel ended its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
While Saddams linkage strategy was at that time very appealing to the Arabs (and more so to the Palestinian people and leadership), bin Ladens today is not. While bin Ladens words may have spoken to the current frustrations of Palestinians, comparisons being made between Palestinian feelings towards Iraq and Afghanistan are inaccurate and overblown.
There are many reasons for the sympathy and solidarity between Palestinians and Iraqis. Not only are they both Arabs and Muslims, and thus culturally and linguistically similar; more importantly, they share geographical proximity. Also, Iraq has sent soldiers to fight with Palestinians in every war since the beginning of the Palestinian problem.
Afghanistan, however, is completely different. First, Afghanis are not Arabs and are distant from Palestine and the Palestinians. Second, most Palestinians did not accept the attack on American civilians on 11 September as justifiable. And, although they also do not justify the use of force and violence by Americans against the Afghanis, they do not strongly identify with the Taliban and bin Laden (except, perhaps, for feelings of common humanity, and a sort of desperation that finally someone is speaking about their cause).
Third, Palestinian society maintains a secular majority that does not identify strongly with the Taliban ideology and regime. That is why, in spite of the appeal of Osama bin Laden, the ordinary Palestinian public has not expressed a great deal of enthusiasm in support of bin Laden or his alleged actions. Those Palestinians who do express such support are Palestinian Islamic fundamentalists who identify with bin Laden on an ideological basis. That explains why the only place where demonstrations in support of bin Laden took place was in and around the Islamic University in Gaza, which is a main stronghold for Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
The internal power struggle
To put these demonstrations in context: some members of Hamas and Jihad have been looking for ways to challenge Palestinian President Yasser Arafats decision to cease fire. Tying Palestinians to bin Laden, they found a chance to undermine the power of the Palestinian Authority by leading a demonstration in solidarity with the Taliban and AlQaida. Arafat likewise responded with political interests in mind. He has not been able to pressure Hamas to cooperate with his unpopular ceasefire; but now was the time to increase pressure on the opposition.
Arafat believed that the majority of the Palestinian public would understand attempts to prevent Hamas aligning Palestinians with the Taliban and bin Laden. It seemed politically feasible to move against Hamas or other factions demonstrations in support of bin Laden, while he was not at all able to move against Hamas when it was violating his ceasefire orders. But in the end, the public was shocked at the level of brutality used by the Palestinian police in handling the demonstrations, and the press was disturbed by the measures taken to prevent it from covering these events.
Avoiding the Taliban trap
These events only confirm earlier analyses of the nature and extent of control Arafat has on the Palestinian territories. For, again, Arafats ability to control depends on whether his public supports his demands. When Arafat wants to enforce something that enjoys the understanding and support of the majority of his people, than he has control and can be effective. But when he is implementing a cause that is unpopular and is imposed upon him, he cannot be in control. He will not be able to impose his will, even by force.
The resort to force has, of course, taken place. And the Palestinian Authority, as it works to avoid a political trap linking the Palestinian struggle with the world pariahs of bin Laden and the Taliban, is absolutely unjustified in the brutality with which it handled the demonstration in Gaza that ended in several deaths. Nor is this the only problem with the Palestinian Authoritys performance in this crisis. The Authority also prevented foreign and local media from covering the demonstration (a policy which only backfired, because it left the media with the false impression that perhaps there were many attempts to demonstrate in support of bin Laden not reported on because of the media blackout).
The Palestinian Authority made another major mistake by not delivering a clear and strong official response to bin Ladens statement, that should have reconfirmed its condemnation of the 11 September attacks and at the same time expressed wariness over the use of force against innocent Afghani civilians. Such a statement would have distinguished the Palestinian cause from that of the Taliban.
Rights and law, not terror
As long as there is an illegitimate Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, as long as the refugee problem of four million Palestinians is not solved, and as long as East Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque remain under the control of the Israeli occupiers, we will continue to see attempts to make use of the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause whether right or wrong coming from Bush or bin Laden.
The Palestinian people, however, root the legitimacy of their cause in human rights and international law, specifically United Nations Security Council 242, which calls for an end to the Israeli occupation. Until the Palestinian problem is resolved it will be difficult, if not impossible, to use the principles of human rights and international law in other conflicts in the region.