The military outcome of any war between the US and Iraq is not in doubt. But if war cannot be prevented a question acutely in the balance in this week of Nato, European Union and trans-Atlantic division the key issue becomes: what kind of Iraq will emerge from the rubble?
Afghanistan offers both an echo and a distraction. The same question was posed there, and has not yet been properly answered. But with all respect to its suffering people, the stakes are much higher in Iraq, the implications more far-reaching, the prospects for a post-Saddam country more uncertain, both in terms of a workable peace in the country and the strategic stability of the region.
In addition, there is the sad but familiar truth that the people whose lives are most endangered are also the least likely to be heard: the oppressed Iraqisthemselves. The intentions, loyalties and aspirations of those whom the US would liberate remain to be discovered.
In their absence, politicians, military planners, diplomats, corporations and intelligence services are engaged in an intense game of shadow boxing for the rewards of victory in power, money and influence. Much of the struggle is beneath the radar screen even of the most informed observers.
But a close encounter with many of the key players in the game suggests that the immediate future and the security of Iraq depends on the interaction between three key interest groups: the Iraqi opposition, who are vitally concerned with establishing a position at the core of the rebuilding of Iraq; the US administration, backed by Republican think-tanks, who have long been considering what a stable Iraq should and could look like; and Iraqs neighbours principally Turkey, Syria and Iran who are now positioning themselves to secure an advantageous result from an unwelcome war.
A fragmented country?
The exiled Iraqi opposition unfortunately, but not unsurprisingly mirrors many of the problems that are faced by the country as a whole. Iraq, an arbitrary construct of the British empire, faces the same ethnic, religious and political divides that are the legacy of many of the countries who share this historical experience. The Kurds in the north, the majority Shiaand the ruling Sunni constitute three defined groupings with historically different and frequently conflicting ambitions.
Their division is compounded by further small but important groups such as the Turcomans and Assyrians both sharing at least the semblance of a name with a neighbouring country. Marrying these different interests into one cohesive and stable entityeluded the Persians, the Ottomans and more recently the British even when the latter initially offered a democratic solution that quickly reverted to central control after a series of revolts in the 1920s.
Front-line peacemakers
What has Saddams rule done to this historical legacy of fragmentation?
The Iraqi opposition favours a strong federal structure leaving current administrative zones unchanged. They propose to set up a transitional government (which they would lead), draft a new federal constitution, and put it to the vote.
The transitional period will be key. Even the opposition admit, in their post-Saddam paper, that: a political vacuum will arise during the period of disintegration and following the downfall of the regime. Many groups and individuals will eventually emerge and compete for power. It should be filled, prior to the war, with a Transitional Authority, which could then assume control.
The problem here is that while the opposition is determined to avoid any period of international or US administration, its own legitimacy will be seen to have emanated from the US invasion and its initial future secured by a US military presence.
But Iraq is not Afghanistan, as Saddam himself has said. It has an established administration, an educated middle class, and an operational structure across the country. These institutions, while currently serving the oppressive Baath regime, will become an important mechanism of the transitional period. If the majority of Iraqis do indeed crave a change of regime, there should be less of a problem in turning these institutions from weapons of oppression into agents for change.
Furthermore, the period of Saddams rule has changed the national landscape from the times of the Persians, Ottomans and British. The experience of suppression, war, torture and dictatorship has arguably intensified the shared sense of being Iraqi. If national cohesion has in the past been hard to achieve, it may be that the Baath dictatorship itself has helped to create it, thus passing on to any new administration the hope of being able to hold it together.
Yet Iraqi identity its capacity to overcome regional, religious and ethnic division is still untested, and the proposed federal structure is drawn along these fault lines. Once Saddams brutal enforcement of Iraqi-hood is broken, will these fragmented groups merely revert to their historical pattern?
A key part of the answer will lie in whether the Iraqi opposition can rely on the consent of many oppressed Iraqis. A large part of the administrative, middle classes belong to the minority, but privileged, Sunni population.
Will the Shia majority continue to tolerate this? Will the Sunni-dominated military relinquish their power without a guaranteed longer-term role in the future of the country? And can the combative, irrepressible Kurdsovercome their dedication to in-fighting to join a peaceful settlement once the worlds attention has moved away from Iraq?
The oppositions plans are worthy in aim and well thought through. But they have been conceived in the safety of conference rooms in London and Washington. The reality on the ground may reveal that Saddams years of oppression have accentuated division rather than brought these oppressed peoples together.
The Americans catch-22
Americans appear to want it both ways. They, or at least some of them, want to implement a clear political strategy in which Iraq emerges as a democratic beacon in the region, heralding a new Middle East era.
But apparently the Iraqis themselves are supposed to lead this. Such policies have so far turned into the nebulous, pleasing-all-camps approaches that have eroded trust between the Iraqis and the US in the last decade, from the 1991 southern and Kurdish uprisings to the abandoned coup attempt of 1996.
The legacy of US unreliability leaves the US needing to decide what its role is the distant godparent hoping that the child makes the right decision, or the cruel-to-be-kind parent? The first is unlikely to be successful, while the second will attract accusations of imperialism.
The US administration (and its UK ally) needs also to be very careful about playing the democracy card. True democracy in Iraq, one not confined by federal constructs, would probably deliver a Shia president. Yet even a federal structure will need to deliver a national majority leader, and an Iraqi democracy with strong links to Iran could (at worst) result in a fundamentalist regime, and (at best) increase Irans power in the Arab world thus strengthening one part of the axis of evil while destroying another.
As a beacon in the region, a democracy in Iraq could have a dramatic impact, raising the possibility of legitimate leaders elsewhere. But historical experience in the Middle East offers complicated lessons to any effort to nurture democratic institutions.
The Algerian and Iranian experience shows that majorities can turn to fundamentalism and are more likely to do so the more western influence is perceived. For the US and UK seeking to re-shape the region, a hands-off approach is not tenable while a hands-on commitment is not desirable.
A tough neighbourhood
Iraqs neighbours could be served by a weakened Iraq and are keenly alert to the possibilities offered them by regime change in Baghdad. Iran aspires to exercise influence over the new Iraq; Syria anticipates an increase in its own international status; Turkey seeks to secure order on its southern border but also covets territory and resources in northern Iraq.
Iran has much to gain and not much to lose. Whatever the new Iraq looks like, Iran will gain greater influence over the internal affairs of Iraq through its long-standing support of the soon-to-be-empowered Iraqi Shia. Its regional power will be enhanced without the counterbalance of a strong and militarised Iraq. And the modernisers are aiming to use this conflict to broaden their influence and contact with the US and Europe by helping the opposition.
Syria also can gain from the denuding of Iraqs regime. Its strictly secular order will give it a distinct role and influence in the region. It will be an important counterbalance to an empowered Iran and its economic reforms will offer it opportunities to share in any future economic revitalisation of the region. However, more importantly, its Lebanon policy shows Syrias readiness to be actively involved in its neighbours affairs, and a new Iraqi regime will not find Syria an easy partner.
Turkey also gains from a weakened Iraq. The country will present itself as the honest brokers in the region, coupling this with extensive deal-making with the US in exchange for its compliance with the war. Moreover, sections of the Turkish elite also harbour territorial claims over the northern Iraqi oil fields which may come to appear less unrealistic in the face of civil war in Iraq.
The Beirut Daily Starreported in August 2002: Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu characterised the Mosul and Kirkuk districts of Iraq as parts of Turkey that were forcibly taken away from it after World War I, and northern Iraq in its entirety as a trust under Turkeys safekeeping, which it will do its utmost to retain.
The Iraqi opposition are very concerned about Turkeys intentions and feel most vulnerable on their northern flank. Turkeys freedom of movement will be one of the pivotal negotiating points currently at issue as Washington seeks to gain Ankaras acceptance for war.
In addition, the oppositions desire for a federal structure in Iraq will threaten Turkey and could be thwarted by the ongoing USTurkish discussions. A neighbouring federal state with Kurdshaving regional autonomy would set an uncomfortable precedent for a Turkey beset by its own Kurdish problems.
A dangerous path
The passionate arguments over Iraq within Nato and between the US and its putative allies reflect the acute danger of this moment in Middle East affairs. The prime objective of any large-scale intervention in the region can only be to help ensure its future peace and stability. Yet, in the event of forced regime change, the fate of Iraq will initially be in the hands the US who will then pass on the baton to the Iraqi opposition and only then will the people of Iraq be offered a chance to decide their own future.
If the country does not implode before that tortuous process has been worked out, the Iraqi identity the most important precursor to long-term stability in the country may be safely said to exist. Even then, however, Iraq would remain very vulnerable to outside influences, and a weakened Iraq might end up merely transferring the focus of fear from one country in the region to another.