The renewal of the “independent British nuclear deterrent” has met remarkably little debate in the UK. Except in Scotland, that is.
What will it take for negotiating parties to reach a lasting deal over Iran's nuclear programme–and what does it mean for the non-proliferation regime?
As violence in Iraq threatens to overshadow nuclear talks between the US and Iran, we must avoid the tendency to rely on simplistic binaries, and instead recognize the linkages between these challenging dynamics to encourage cooperation.
Russia's moves into Crimea have sparked almost reflexive predictions of a new cold war. But NATO members once again fail to understand its lessons, continuing to squander opportunities for arms control, cooperation and dialogue.
The belief that unilateral reductions in the UK’s nuclear-weapons arsenal would have no beneficial international impact is deeply engrained in officialdom—deeply engrained and wrong
The Non-proliferation Treaty has survived for nearly half a century but it has not fostered nuclear disarmament—and it could be facing decay
Given political will, what could nuclear weapon states, individually and as a group, realistically do to positively affect change and inject hope into the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
We are indeed witnessing a slide towards fewer positive options, but such slides can be reversed. Iran is ready to negotiate, just not on the terms offered by the West.
Debates on the Iranian nuclear programme tend to adopt a Manichean view depicting it as a major security threat. If we want to properly address the issue of nuclear proliferation, it is time to switch to a different framework for negotiations.
In the context of worsening relations between Iran, Syria and the west, Saeed Rahnema gave a bleak assessment of the likelihood of impending conflict. Though serious, Paul Ingram argues there are reasons to remain optimistic.
