In an article published on the Conservative Home website recently, David Cameron provided stinging criticism of Gordon Brown’s ‘artificial’ Britishness, defined by ‘grand top-down schemes’ that had little substance and were primarily aimed at securing media coverage. Cameron suggested that a future Conservative government would restore the nation’s pride and common endeavour, much as, he claims, Margaret Thatcher did after her election in 1979. The Conservatives were, according to Cameron, patriotic to the core; their Britishness reflects the broad, popular attitudes of the British people.
He identified three ways to further strengthen our national identity and give people reasons to feel pride in their country. First, he suggested a move away from the ‘wrong-headed doctrine of state multiculturalism’. This would be achieved by promoting a single national community where new citizens should speak ‘our common language’. Second, the Conservatives would bring back the ‘proper teaching of British history in schools’ based on facts and dates to encourage feeling for Britain’s heritage. Third, a more emotional connection would be re-established with ‘forgotten’ institutions that define Britishness, such as the monarchy, armed forces and parliament. He argues that these institutions are vital to understanding Britishness but have been consistently undermined by the Labour government. Crucially, Cameron argued that Labour had not stood up to Brussels, thus compromising British sovereignty and identity.
This latest foray into the ‘politics of Britishness’ is instructive. Though Cameron claims the Conservatives are not about to enter a ‘my flag is bigger than yours’ contest, he follows a long tradition of party leaders who believe they are the natural patriotic party of the Union. However, it is clear that he is hindered by an enduring Anglo-Britishness which fails to acknowledge the complexity of debates across the UK concerning identity and citizenship. While Cameron derides Brown, it is striking how similar their constructions of Britishness are. Cameron draws on a narrative that is almost identical in its emphasis on British values, institutions and history.
But the ‘forgotten institutions’ that Cameron identifies are not ones that elicit universal patriotism. Though the monarchy is key to our constitution, it is not an institution that evokes an inclusive sense of citizenship. Poll data suggests at least a quarter of Britons would readily embrace a British republic. And, whilst the armed forces are certainly more popular in light of recent painful losses in Iraq and Afghanistan, their deployment and methods also divide opinion. Moreover, it is not clear after the recent expenses scandals why the general public would wish to shape a British identity around the Houses of Parliament. Cameron’s instinctive recourse to oppositional Euroscepticism fails to address broader issues concerning the need to enact major reforms of our democratic institutions.
Like Brown, Cameron would appear not to understand the distinctions between citizenship and nationality. When discussing what constitutes a civic national identity, he consistently refers to Britain rather than the United Kingdom. Such shortcomings are not merely constitutional pedantry. Though the Conservatives have rebuilt links with the Ulster Unionists, Cameron would appear insensitive to the idea that Britishness is an identity that covers the whole of the UK (and across part of the former Empire) and not just Britain. It would suggest that he has difficulties with some aspects of Unionist Britishness in Northern Ireland, particularly the key role of Protestantism. Indeed, Cameron appears to be unaware of the complexities of a multi-national, multi-cultural Britishness. His focus on the centrality of the English language is also strikingly similar to that of David Blunkett. Both fail to acknowledge that the UK has always been multi-lingual, or indeed that proficiency in languages is a national asset.
Whilst Cameron rejects the notion of a 'top down' Britishness, his alternative proposals are also government-driven. The central tenets of a British historical narrative taught in schools would obviously be defined by the government (or, ironically, an education Quango) to provide some consistency in the curriculum. However, his claims for the powers of state-taught history lack evidence that such approaches actually shape popular attitudes to citizenship and identity. If, as Cameron suggests, a citizenship test and oath for migrants is limited in its efficacy, why should history lessons define a common sense of Britishness? Cameron's focus on the English history curriculum also fails to acknowledge the growing ‘history wars’ across the UK. Devolution has empowered the Scots and Welsh in particular to review approaches to history teaching in schools to provide a greater national focus that challenges the centrality of ‘our Island story’. It is unlikely that a Conservative-led Westminister government would be able to articulate and disseminate a British national historical narrative to teach in schools which would be accepted in Edinburgh, Cardiff or Belfast.
Cameron’s intervention suggests that debates about citizenship, identity and patriotism could prove an important factor in the forthcoming general election. However, invoking the legacy of Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 who promoted a form of Anglo-Britishness is misguided. Both Thatcher and Major were blind to subtleties of citizenship and identity across the UK, consistently conflating Britishness with Englishness. They were indeed highly-successful in convincing a significant number of Scots and Welsh that Westminster was an English institution and their future lay in independence from the UK. By adopting the same approach, Cameron’s myopic Britishness might simply force the Union further apart.