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All the frogs croak before a storm: Dostoevsky versus Tolstoy on Humanitarian Interventions

Dostoevsky was in favor of military intervention in the Balkans, Tolstoy opposed to it. The arguments they put forward are surprisingly relevant to our own current wars.

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A little background – in the summer of 1875, Orthodox Christians in  Herzogovina revolted against their Ottoman overlords. In 1876, the Slav  principalities of Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and  there was an uprising in Bulgaria. In Russia, there was fervent support  for the Serbian cause. Russians voluntarily sent money and medical  supplies to the Orthodox Slavs, and many Russian volunteers went to the  Balkans to fight. Russian newspapers took up the Serb cause, as is  reflected in this fictional discussion between Koznyshev and Prince  Shcherbatsky from Tolstoy's novel Anna Karennina:

"All  the most diverse sections of the educated public, hostile before, are  merged in one.  Every division is at an end, all the public organs say  the same thing over and over again, all feel the mighty torrent that has  overtaken them and is carrying them in one direction."

"Yes,  all the newspapers do say the same thing", said the prince. "That's  true.  But so it is the same thing that all the frogs croak before a  storm. One can hear nothing for them."

From the summer of 1876 to the spring of 1877, there was heated public  debate in Russia over whether to engage in the conflict in the Balkans.  Fyodor Dostoevsky was passionately in favor of military intervention,  for humanitarian and patriotic reasons – Leo Tolstoy, although not yet a  fully-fledged pacifist, could not see the point of Russia getting  involved.

Dostoevsky was in tune with the popular mood. His serialised publication A Writer’s Diary,  which ran around this time, often reminds me of the U.S. “war blogs” of  2002-3. It’s fascinating how Dostoevsky’s various motivations for  supporting the war merge and reinforce each other. His most laudable  motive is his acute empathy with suffering, the sense of humanitarian  urgency he has about putting an end to atrocities committed by the  Turks. But he segues easily from reporting horrific massacres to  fantasizing about a Russian conquest of Constantinople, the center of  Orthodox Christianity. Dostoevsky admires Russian heroes and despises  foreign diplomats, and condemns those who “rattle on about the damage  that war can cause in an economic sense.” He is sublimely confident the  Serbs will welcome Russian intervention, and that those who don’t are an  unrepresentative class out of touch with their own people. He has no  sense that atrocities are occurring on both sides.

Dostoesvsky feels that a national malaise has been conquered in Russia,  and that the extent of popular support for the Serbs is proof of the  spiritual superiority of the people to the intelligentsia. He is angry  with those Russians who feel sympathy for the Turks. He is completely  certain of victory and of being on the side of history, and has  suggestions about what to do once the Ottoman Empire is completely  crushed. He is convinced of his own country's exceptionalism, that the  pro-war movement “in its self-sacrificing nature and disinterestedness,  in its pious religious thirst to suffer for a righteous cause,  is almost without precedent among other nations.” and has a hard time  crediting the good faith of anyone who sees things differently.  Sometimes he talks in terms of a “crusade,” and indulges the apocalyptic  dream of a final war between Christianity and Islam.

In  England, the leader of the Opposition, William Gladstone, was appalled  by Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria and thought England should help drive  the Turks out of that country -- but the Prime Minister Benjamin  Disraeli, in a spirit of realpolitik, maintained the official British  policy of siding with Turkey against Russia. That Disraeli was a Jew  provided Dostoevsky with some scope for conspiracy theorizing.

Meanwhile Tolstoy was finishing Anna Karennina.  When Vronsky goes off to war after Anna's suicide – equipping a  squadron at his personal expense – this is the war he’s headed for.  Katkov's Russian Herald, which was serializing Tolstoy's enormously  popular novel as it came out, declined to carry the eighth part, instead  printing the following note –

“In  the previous issue, the words 'to be continued' appeared at the end of  the Anna Karennina installment. But with the death of the heroine the  novel really comes to an end. The author had planned an epilogue of a  few pages, in which we learn that Vronsky, distraught and grieving, left  for Serbia as a volunteer in the army. The other characters are all  well, but Levin, in his country retreat, remains hostile to the  volunteers and the Slavophiles. Perhaps the author will add chapters to  this effect in a special edition to this novel.”


The Herald slyly implies that Levin – the character in Anna Karennina  most directly based on Tolstoy – is not quite well. While killing off  Anna at the end of the penultimate issue may have been bad timing  suspense-wise, the real problem was probably that the Herald was  campaigning for intervention in the Balkans, in the face of Czar  Alexander II's continued hesitation.

Levin in Part Eight is actually not so much “hostile” to the  Slavophiles as baffled by them. In conversation with the likes of  Koznyshev, Levin is not even confrontational enough to keep up the  argument for very long. His attitude, basically Tolstoy's own, is of  bewilderment that so many people are passionately committed to actions  in a place they know little about – it's a feeling I sometimes have  myself when listening to defenses of our current involvement in Libya.  Levin suggests that, when people become passionately committed to a  faraway cause, instead of devoting themselves to problems nearer at  hand, the reason is probably to be found in their own psychological  makeup.

This seems like a perceptive diagnosis in Dostoevsky’s case. The sheer  number of arguments Dostoevsky has for going to war raises the suspicion  that none of them are the real reason – Slavoj Žižek has made a similar  point about George W. Bush and the Iraq War. In A Writer’s Diary,  Dostoevsky suggests that war is the only way to unify Russia's  different classes, that Russia has a moral duty to seize this chance for  an “unprecedented war for the sake of the weak and oppressed” and  fulfill Russia's world-historical destiny. Where Dostoevsky insists that  the right answers are best found in deep emotion, and faith that the  world is ripe for transformation, Tolstoy favors a dispassionate,  clearheaded solution. Of course, Tolstoy’s politics are equally a  reflection of his own emotional state -- his sense of alienation with  the pro-war hysteria raging around him may have deepened his sense of  personal crisis and paved the way for his later pacifism.

Tolstoy brought out Part Eight of Anna Karennina in a separate edition at personal expense. When Dostoevsky read it, he was outraged. Dostoevsky's response in A Writer’s Diary  is to juxtapose the terrible image of a girl forced to watch her father  being flayed to death with the image of Levin remaining philosophically  serene on his large estate. Pacifism requires one to maintain a certain  emotional distance. Dostoevsky bypasses Tolstoy with a direct emotional  appeal -- how can we just stand by and do nothing while such terrible  things are being done? And Dostoevsky may have a point that Tolstoy's  privileged lifestyle contributes to his sense of detachment.

By this point in their argument, Russia had formally declared war on  Turkey. The war lasted about a year, there were systematic attacks by  Cossacks against Muslims and Jews, and by 1879, one-third of all the  Muslims of Bosnia-Herzogovina had either emigrated or been killed. An  intriguing piece of historical trivia is that this war gave birth to the  word “jingoism,” coined from a British music hall song of the time –

“We don't want to fight but by Jingo if we do
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.
We've fought the Bear before, and while we're Britons true
The Russians shall not have Constantinople.”

In the event, the British largely kept out of the war – although they  did send a fleet to Constantinople when the Russian Army was getting  near that city. A Russian-Turkish treaty was signed by which Russia won  most of her demands – including Serbian independence, self-rule in  Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eased restrictions for Christians under Turkish  rule – but the united European powers demanded a revision of the treaty,  and at the Congress of Berlin these Russian gains were reversed. The  Congress of Berlin allowed Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina  and -- following a geopolitical logic that puzzled commentators even at  the time -- Britain to take over Cyprus. Lasting peace did not ensue in  any of these places.

The longer-term consequences of the war are addressed by a later great  Russian novelist, Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, in his historical work The Russian Question.  Solzhenitsyn notes that there were four eighteenth-century and four  nineteenth-century Russo-Turkish wars. Solzhenitsyn writes, “Two  wretched ideas relentlessly tormented and pulled all our rulers in  succession: to help and to save the Transcaucasian Christians, and to  help and to save the Orthodox in the Balkans. One can acknowledge the  loftiness of these moral principles, but not to the extent of total  disregard for the interests of the State...”

Solzhenitsyn singles out the 1877 war for special censure -- “Such a  ‘victorious’ war is worth no more than a lost one – cheaper yet, to not  start it at all. Russian military and financial strength was  undermined, the public’s spirit fell; and it was then that the  revolutionary era with its terrorism began to gain momentum...”

The main long-term impact of the Russo-Turkish wars was to weaken both  Empires to the point of collapse, with resulting humanitarian disasters  exceeding those that Dostoevsky justly condemned. While the impulse  towards humanitarian intervention is a worthy one, the results may be  protracted civil war, escalating carnage, and the weakening of the  intervening countries. Will future historians record that a spate of  early twenty-first century wars in the Arab world were among the key  factors that brought the American Century to a close?

James Warner

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