The fourth round of Lebanons parliamentary election on 19 June has produced both clarity and worry for Lebanons voters and citizens. A decisive overall majority in the 128-seat chamber for the anti-Syrian alliance led by Saad Hariri, son of the ex-prime minister Rafiq Hariri who was assassinated on 14 February, is combined with concern over Hizbollahs continued armed presence, sectarian divisions between Lebanons various confessional groups, and the dangers of a sting in the Syrian tail even after the evacuation of Syrian armed forces.
Also on the Lebanese spring in openDemocracy:
Hazem Saghieh, Rafiq Hariris murder: why do Lebanese blame Syria? (February 2005)
Roger Scruton, Lebanon before and after Syria (March 2005)
Zaid Al-Ali, Lebanons pre-election hangover (May 2005)
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The Lebanon factor
The accumulated result of the voting is that Lebanese people face a plethora of questions with very few answers. It seems a long time since the protest wave following Rafiq Hariris killing and the spring outburst of youthful rebellion (often described as the Lebanese spring or cedar revolution) in Beirut and much of Lebanon.
The assassination on 2 June of the courageous journalist and intellectual Samir Kassir showed that when the Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon, their intelligence services did not necessarily go with them. Meanwhile, the Lebanese security service, which cooperated with the Syrians, has lost its authority without showing itself capable of internal reform. The Lebanese opposition has yet either to wield power over the security situation or form its own, alternative agencies. The result is an alarming security vacuum.
But the uncertainty surrounding Lebanons future is not only a question of security: the political factors involved are no less disturbing. Lebanons sectarian divisions, which became more deeply entrenched during the years of Syrian rule, have been exacerbated even further in the wake of the spring uprising. This was evident in the campaigning for the four-part parliamentary elections, with their agenda driven by sectarian interests, egocentric leaders, mutual fear and the desire of each faction simply to gain more seats than its rivals rather than by the wider interests of Lebanon.
This unpromising spectacle was made gloomier still by the return to Lebanon of General Michel Aoun from fourteen years exile in Paris. In 1989 this paranoid former soldier triggered a war with his allies in the Lebanese Forces which paved the way for the Syrians to enter Christian areas. His combustible return now threatens to do almost the same thing with the Lebanese opposition.
In collaboration with the remnants of the old regime, using his Free Patriotic Movement as a vehicle, he has helped divide the opposition ranks, winning a bloc of 21 seats in the 128-seat parliament. Aouns aim, almost certainly, is to inherit the position of the current Lebanese president, Emile Lahoud.
The Hizbollah factor
Americas precipitate desire for the elections to be held at any price has had dire consequences. This is partly the result of Lebanons heavily biased electoral law, which was drawn up by the Syrians to keep their political stooges in office. The most voraciously sectarian groups are now set to consolidate their grip on parliament.
One of them is Hizbollah, which has managed to prove that most Shia Muslims in Lebanon (numerically the countrys largest sectarian group) support its desire to keep its weapons. This presents the Lebanese with an impossible dilemma. To disarm Hizbollah in response to western demands, on the basis that legitimate authority should have a monopoly over the means of violence, risks sparking another civil war. But to allow Hizbollah to retain its weapons and capacity to act militarily would mean there was no single legitimate authority in Beirut, placing Lebanon beyond the pale of international law.
It is difficult for the more rational Lebanese to avoid this quandary. They have been telling the west that they will persuade Hizbollah through dialogue to give up its arms. On 25 May, Hizbollahs general-secretary Hassan Nasrallah responded with a furious speech in which he claimed that his organisation possessed more than 12,000 missiles and swore to cut off the hands of anyone who contemplated stripping Hizbollah of its arsenal. Evidently the Iraqi quagmire in which America finds itself encouraged Nasrallah to make these remarks, which cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of dialogue with his group.
The American and regional factors
The issue of Hizbollah is intimately linked to Americas troubled relations with both Iran and Syria. If Iran has genuinely developed a nuclear weapon, this will have grave implications. It will be equally dangerous if the repressive Syrian regime remains in power, especially since the Baath party there recently reaffirmed the one-party system at its tenth regional conference. Indeed, this principle is enshrined in paragraph 8 of the Syrian constitution.
However, Americas ideological approach to Iran and Syria serves little purpose. The United States insistence on fighting so many battles on so many fronts will make it very hard to guarantee Iraqs security or to prevent tension from spreading to Lebanon. At the same time, Israels increasingly inflexible policies have also left the moderate Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, in an ever more difficult position.
Lebanons horizon is clouded partly by local issues, partly by the influence of extended political families and partly by problems of regional dimensions. Will the support of the United States and France be enough to allow this long-suffering country to overcome these threats? Or should the Lebanese be preparing themselves for a repetition of past tragedies?
Ya-Libnan
http://yalibnan.com/site/
Daily Star, Beirut
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/home2.asp
Al-Massar
http://www.al-massar.com/
Lebanese political journal (blog)
http://lebop.blogspot.com/