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A return to financial health is simple: Glass Steagall plus transparency

Financial regulation in the wake of the credit crisis is a simpler matter than the re-moralising advocated by Roger Scruton (Unreal Estates). Simply return to the regulatory environment pre-1999 and press on with transparency in markets

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Roger Scruton writes (Unreal Estate) of the need for a re-moralised economy and of changing attitudes, over  the years, concerning how a moral economy may best be achieved: from the  economic statism of post-war Britain to the Thatcherite revolution, and  even to the views of the Prophet. He focuses on the moral requirement  to repay money that you borrow and suggests that, with current high debt  levels in Europe and elsewhere, we are witnessing a "demoralisation of  economic life": however, if this is the case, demoralisation of economic  life with respect to sovereign debt is nothing new. There is a long and  ignoble tradition of states reneging on debt obligations long before  British statism or Thatcherism and perhaps even before the Prophet. What  does seem to be a new experience is that so many countries have such  high debt levels all at the same time.

It is uncontroversial to be frustrated by, and even  to despair at, the actions of politicians who allowed or were complicit  in allowing these high levels of debt to be reached. One may have more  sympathy towards some nations than to others, but repaying the debts,  even for those nations that are willing and able to do it, will almost  certainly take decades: however, Roger also suggests that the trading of  bonds is somehow tied in with demoralisation, commenting that "the  Prophet was appalled by the sale and purchase of unreal things" and  that "debts are no longer regarded as obligations to be met, but as  assets to be traded."


It is not clear to me from Roger's article what  specific measures he would propose in order to return to a more moral  economy. One presumes he would like to see greater effort on the part of  political elites and other policy makers to repay the debts as early as  possible. However, he does say, in respect of "bubbles of the kind that  we have recently seen" that "I suspect...the search for regulations  that would prevent them is a futile use of public funds and political  energy".


In my view it is enormously difficult to plan a  return to what some may view to be a moralised economy. One major  difficulty will be in gaining general agreement on what exactly it  constitutes. How to get there will present  further difficulties. Roger refers to the Prophet, but  it is not clear to me that economies following Islamic financial codes are  any more moralised than those that do not, nor are they immune to  the economic forces that have caused difficulties for Western and other  economies. The economy of Dubai has proved that.


I prefer to focus on measures that can and should be  taken even in the event that no such return to a moralised economy  may be envisaged. In particular, there are 2 measures that policy makers  must take in order to return to a more secure world economy. Firstly, I  disagree with Roger with respect to regulations: in my view, key  components to the credit and banking crises in the US and UK were the  repeal of the Glass Steagall Act by President Clinton in 1999 and the  enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act in 2000, leading to  the introduction of "light touch" regulation in the UK. The new  regulatory regime in the US allowed Lehman Brothers to rack up leverage  of 30.7 times (probably heavily window-dressed) in its last annual  financial statements; and enabled commercial banks to take high risk  trading positions in mortgage bond portfolios that would not have been  permitted prior to the repeal of Glass Steagall and leading to the  failure and near-failure of numerous banks.


The trend for US commercial banks to take investment  banking positions onto their balance sheets was followed in Continental  Europe, particularly in Germany and Switzerland and with entirely  predictable results.


The much-vaunted "light touch" system in the UK  enabled banks such as HBOS and Bradford and Bingley to increase their  balance sheets substantially by borrowing funds on international money  markets where previously they had been restricted to relying upon their  traditional deposit bases. When the international money markets dried up  after the collapse of Lehman, HBOS and Bradford and Bingley, among  others, went to the wall. The "light touch" regime also allowed UK banks  to compete for new mortgage business by offering 125% mortgages, where  95% had previously been the normal ceiling, and allowed mortgages on  greater multiples of income than under the previous regime. Countries  that did not follow the trend towards reduced regulation and where banks  were still regulated under more traditional regimes, such as Australia  and Canada, did not encounter housing bubbles or banking industry  collapses.


The second measure must be to maintain levels of  market transparency and to make improvements where possible. In  particular, it is vitally important that sovereign debt should be openly  traded. The problems of political profligacy and dishonesty in Greece  were first brought to light, not by Greek politicians, not by the EU,  not by political or economic journalists, but by traders in  international government bond markets who sold Greek debt, and bought  protection on other positions, in response to persistent rumours of  irregularities in Greek national finances. Local politicians protested  vehemently that the Greek economy was being attacked by speculators  (always a favoured response for troubled politicians) and Greek Prime  Minister Papandreou went on a world tour to drum up support for his  "anti-speculator" position. Subsequently it was revealed that there was  little evidence of speculation and that much of the trading was by  holders of Greek bonds unwinding or hedging their exposures.

It is clear  to me that we need more openness in financial markets, not less, and  that any measure that holds politicians to account for their actions  must be a good thing, whether that measure involves openness of  government bond trading or, for example, investigations into alleged  secret deals with American investment banks designed to hide massive and  unreported indebtedness. Greece is not on the verge of national  bankruptcy because investors in Greek bonds sold or hedged their  exposures, Greece is in that position because a political culture of  lies and deception developed over a period of a number of years. The  international government bond market helped to expose that culture.


As an aside, current calls within the EU from  Messrs Papandreou and Barroso, among others, for Eurozone bonds to be  backed by all nations that are members of the euro can only lead to  reduced transparency of national accounting and indebtedness and must be  rejected if the Eurozone economy is not to be further compromised by  the type of political deceptions that led to the current crisis..

Michael Bullen

Michael Bullen was trained as an economist and is a qualified Chartered Accountant. He has had a profession in the City as a proprietary trader at various banks and hedge funds, including JPMorgan, Sc

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