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Lebanon and the "Spring" of others

Syria’s unrest has allowed Lebanon to finally play a role in the Arab uprisings, with potentially dangerous effects, argues Fatima Issawi

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The  so-called Arab Spring has proved again that the main practical  “function” of Lebanon remains to be a battlefield for other's  grievances. While the Arab world is raging with pro-democracy protests,  the Lebanese scene is surprisingly, for once, very calm. As a friend  rightly described it, Lebanon is becoming a sleepy backyard.

As  has historically been the case with regional crises, the Lebanese have  embraced the current unrest in Syria. Divisions between the two main  political blocks in the country - the pro-Western block, represented by  the so-called 14 March coalition, and the pro-Syrian regime, the  Iranian-backed 8 March movement which is controlling the present  government –are taking up the new slogans for the bitter conflict  between the two camps, yet this remains contained in the political  arena.

The  Syrian rebellion against the Assad regime was accompanied by rumours  accusing the Future movement of Saad Hariri (the former Prime Minister  who headed a pro-Western coalition for nearly 6 years) of secretly  funding the Syrian rebels and smuggling arms to Syrian territory.  Although Hariri denied these accusations, to the extent in the first  stage of the Syrian unrest of forbidding his parliamentary block and his  media outlets to openly tackle the Syrian situation, it is important to  note that the Lebanese Sunni are seen as the main supporters of the  country’s oppressed neighbours. Sunni Islamist political groups and  parties are the most vocal opponents of the Syrian regime, strongly  voicing their support for the Syrian protesters and de facto adopting their cause.  

On  the other side, rumours have also been raging about a direct  implication of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah group in training and  supporting the Syrian regime’s repression of its people. Some figures  among Syrian human rights activists have talked openly about the  presence of “Lebanese agents” in the "Shabbiha" (a popular expression  describing civilians used by the regime to brutally repress  demonstrators). The Shia group, Hezbollah, whose leaders’ photos have  been shattered in many Syrian protests while antagonistic slogans have  been chanted against him, had to issue press statements denying any  involvement in the regime’s repression of the Syrian protesters.

With  the crackdown on anti-government protesters becoming harsher, the  Lebanese villages at the border with Syria became the harbour of  thousands of frightened civilians seeking refuge on Lebanese soil. The  ordeal of these Syrian civilians, who are strongly supported by the  Sunni community of Tripoli, the main northern Lebanese city, has  triggered a wave of violence between the city’s Sunni and Alawite neighbourhoods. These bitter  confrontations between two neighbourhoods, known for a long and bloody  history, are a sample of what could be the price of the Syrian unrest if it moved into Lebanese territory.

On  the pretext of not intervening in the internal affairs of neighbouring  countries, the policy of non-intervention in Syrian affairs has been  gaining more and more ground, even within the 14 March coalition, in  opposition to a popular mood within its base which is calling for a  clear Lebanese stance in support of the Syrian protests and denouncing  the brutality of the regime. In the first months of the Syrian protests,  the political leaders of the March 14 coalition were committed to an  implicit silence with regard to the unrest in Syria. The only political  party which dared to publicly express its support for the Syrian  rebellion was the Islamic Group (al Jamaa al Islamiya), founded in 1952  as the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. This unique voice in  support of the rebellion's cause strengthens the fears that the Syrian  protest may have an Islamist face.

In contrast with the apparent indifference of politicians, civil society has taken the initiative to organize via the social media several rallies bringing together journalists, youth and intellectuals  and breaking the wall of silence. These demonstrations are attracting  growing participation and are systematically confronted with  counter-demonstrations, claiming support for the Syrian regime. The site  of the Syrian embassy in Beirut’s fashionable Hamra district is  becoming the theatre of scuffles between supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime, with  the media frequently reporting attacks on opponents of the Assad regime  carried out by what these reports describe as the Lebanese “Shabbiha”.

On the other side, the pro-Syrian regime block, headed by Hezbollah, continues to voice its support for the Syrian regime, stressing that the only way out of the present  bloodshed is to implement the political and economic reforms promised by  the Syrian President. Surprisingly, the most prominent voice in support  of the Syrian regime in Lebanon is the Christian leader, General Michel  Aoun, who a decade ago fought a losing war against the Syrian army  which led him to a long exile.  

The  Christian leader, who has the major representation within a ruling  alliance controlled by Hezbollah, has lately become the most vocal  partisan of the Syrian regime in Lebanon. His defence of the Syrian regime goes as far as denying the brutality demonstrated  by the regime during the bloody attack against the iconic Syrian city of  Hama. According to General Aoun, Syria is calm and the Syrian army did  not use force against civilians in Hama, which was subject to a brutal  assault by the Syrian army reportedly causing hundreds of death among  civilians. Behind the General’s position lies a fierce campaign of fear,  presenting the Assad regime as the main protector of Christians’ future  in the region against the emergence of a hard-line Islamist regime with  tough radical affiliations. These fears are strongly penetrating the  hearts and minds of Aoun’s supporters, for whom the Syrian regime used  to be their fiercest enemy. The Christian fears of further exclusion from  decision-making are aggravated by the example of the Iraqi Christians’  ordeal. For many of Aoun’s supporters the "Taif" accord, which put an  end to the Lebanese civil war (1992), took power away from the Maronite  president and gave it to a cabinet led by a Sunni prime minister,  becoming a symbol of the Christians' defeat.

Lebanese  Christians are split between the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, a  partner in the pro-Western March 14 coalition, and the Change and  Reform parliamentary bloc of Michel Aoun, a close ally of Hezbollah and  represented in the present government. The Christian parties represented  within the 14 March coalition are downplaying these fears and assuring  their supporters that the implications of the so called Arab Spring will  not jeopardise the future of the Christians of the region.

The  official Lebanese position with regard to the UN Security Council  stance on Syria is the best expression of the Lebanese dilemma. The UN  Security Council presidential statement condemning the recent upsurge of  violence in Syria was disavowed, although not blocked, by Lebanon. The  Lebanese Prime Minister, Najib Mikati,  a Sunni business tycoon backed by Hezbollah, considered that this  position “pleased all parties and took into account Lebanon’s  individualities”. The Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem,  described the decision as “right and wise”. The leader of the Hezbollah  parliamentary bloc Loyalty to the Resistance, Mohammad  Raad , made a statement accusing “foreign powers "of intervening in  Syria not in order to press for reforms, but to make the country “yield  and abandon the resistance”.

Lebanon  is, as always, the perfect field for raising grievances, especially  when these grievances are not those of the Lebanese people. Unlike other  Arab nations, the Lebanese people did not find any common grievances to  lead them onto the streets. A timid attempt to organize demonstrations calling for the fall of the confessional system collapsed after a few  restricted protests. The group known as the “civil campaign to bring  down the confessional system” was quickly adopted by the March 8 bloc,  and especially the Lebanese parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri.  Abrogating the confessional regime would open the door for the hegemony  of the mainly Shia majority on the political scene, ending the de facto tradition of a Christian presidency of the country.

The  "Spring" of other Arab nations has been no less problematic and  divisive for the Lebanese. The successive and surprising triumphs of the  pro-democracy protesters in Tunisia and Egypt were received with deep  doubts by the pro-Western camp, clearly voicing its fears of an Islamist  takeover which could result in a further strengthening of the  pro-Iranian camp. The mood within the supporters of the pro-resistance  camp was festive.  The fall of the Egyptian president was welcomed in  Beirut with gunfire celebrating the defeat of a symbol of the  pro-Western camp. When Syrian cities became the main scene of the Arab  revolution, fears and joys shifted dramatically. For the supporters of  the pro-Western camp, the Syrian revolution is the "mother of all  revolutions" in an Arab world embracing change - for the best or the  worst, no matter. For their rivals, the Arab Spring is becoming the  symbol of the defeat of Arab regimes which de facto although  dictatorships, are secular, to the benefit of a radical Islamism which  will transform the face of the Arab world in the direction of greater  exclusion.  

The  Syrian unrest has provided the Lebanese with an excellent opportunity  to finally be part of the Arab uprisings, in what has long been their  own way: where do you find yourself in others' grievances?


Fatima El Issawi

Fatima El Issawi is a London-based analyst and researcher. She was the press officer for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on The Hague.

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