Skip to content

Lebanon’s pre-election hangover

Published:

The elections to Lebanon’s parliament on 29 May are taking place amid a strange political mixture of engagement and disaffection. A little over three months since the country was convulsed by popular demonstrations in the aftermath of the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and soon after the final withdrawal of Syrian forces, Lebanese politicians are jostling for power in Beirut while evading difficult issues that surround them in their society and region.

The “cedar revolution” already seems distant, and even some leading politicians themselves are fed up. The decision by Hariri’s successor as prime minister Omar Karami to boycott the polls is the latest in a series. The politicians’ grievance is an electoral law which – although it is has the appearance of balancing Lebanon’s “consociational democracy” by encouraging a non-confessional, anti-sectarian politics – also impels the formation of strategic party alliances and effectively decides in advance who the winners will be.

Also by Zaid al-Ali on openDemocracy:

“Iraq – the lost generation” (August 2004)

“Iraq’s dangerous elections” (December 2004)

The end of secularism in Iraq” (May 2005)

If you find this material valuable, please send openDemocracy a donation so that we can keep dialogue about democracy alive and make it accessible to all

This electoral law, passed in 2000, split Lebanon into regional constituencies in a way designed to favour Syria’s political allies. Since then, several political parties have shifted their positions, and many who were previously pro-Syrian have joined the anti-Syrian “opposition”. This made the law effectively obsolete as well as unpopular, but disagreement about its replacement means that it remains in place for the current elections.

The law created several large constituencies across Lebanon and granted the winning party or political alliance in each the power of appointing the representatives it sends to parliament. In several large constituencies there are religious minorities which will not be able to muster enough votes, guaranteeing that they will not be represented in parliament.

At the same time, Lebanon’s constitution provides that 64 out of 128 MPs must be Christian; this means that the winning parties or alliances in certain constituencies will be obliged to appoint Christian MPs to represent them, even though they may not be Christian themselves.

For example, Jezzine, a strongly Christian area, is part of a larger southern constituency that is mainly Shi’a Muslim. The major Shi’a parties, Hizbollah and Amal, have created an alliance that is likely to win a large majority of votes in the area. The people of Jezzine have no chance of electing their “natural” representatives and their votes will have no effect, but because parliament has to be 50% Christian, Hizbollah-Amal will appoint Christians whose first loyalty will be to them rather than to their co-religionists.

The result is that almost all Lebanon’s major political parties have been striving to form alliances on a national basis, which discourages democratic competition and increases the chances of a parliament dominated by rigid “blocs” that distribute power among themselves.

The Michel Aoun factor

A notable exception to this pattern is Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which officially shuns sectarian politics although most of its members are Christian. Aoun, who returned to Lebanon in May 2005 from a fifteen-year exile in France, is regarded as a talented politician with an insatiable ego. Some fear that his strongly populist rhetoric may bring old tensions back to the surface of Lebanese politics.

The FPM has announced that it will not enter into an alliance with the Progressive Socialist Party – the principally Druze party led by Kamal Jumblatt that is one of the main components of the anti-Syrian opposition. Aoun’s decision to approach the elections on the basis of ballots rather than political alliances has increased his appeal to many ordinary Lebanese.

Another interesting development is that the Mustaqbal movement, a Sunni Muslim party led by the Hariri’s son Saad, has created an alliance with Solange Gemayel, a popular figure in the Christian community. Typically, the Mustaqbal movement merely appoints Christians who are loyal to it, but the current political context – especially shared fears of a rising Shi’a community – favours an alliance between the Sunni and Christian communities.

The Iran factor

Such political manoeuvrings cannot conceal a looming confrontation between some of the country’s most powerful political forces that is likely to erupt soon after the elections. The question at issue is whether Hizbollah, one of Lebanon’s most important political parties but also an armed militia, should disarm.

Hizbollah originally developed as a means to resist Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. It received training and logistical support from the Iranian revolutionary guards from the early 1980s, and continues to enjoy strong ties with Iran’s leadership. The Israelis have since withdrawn from Lebanon almost entirely, something hailed a great success for the resistance movement while robbing it of its main purpose – though it continues to explore new ways of threatening Israel itself.

Most Lebanese now argue that the time has come for Hizbollah to disarm. Hizbollah’s leadership tends to disagree with this sentiment. Indeed, senior leaders have declared: “if we have to choose between disarmament and death, we choose death”.

There is an Iranian dimension here, one linked to Iranian efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Tehran is aware that it is in the Americans’ firing line, and for them the armed wing of Hizbollah serves as a form of deterrent against the United States. Hizbollah is more than capable of unleashing havoc across northern Israel if their Iranian backers so wished it.

The issue of Hizbollah’s disarmament is therefore a middle-east regional issue as well as an internal Lebanese one. Iran will not easily accept losing one of its main pieces on the international chessboard, particularly when the prize is a nuclear shield against future American involvement in their country. Whatever the colour of the parliament Lebanon’s people elect on 29 May, Lebanese politicians will be confronted with difficult choices that cannot long be evaded.

Tags:

More from Zaid Al-Ali

See all