The UK doggedly maintains an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ but a naval officer has blown the whistle on the system’s inherent insecurity—with its potentially incalculable implications.
The conventional wisdom among nuclear-weapons powers is that their arsenals can only be dismantled multilaterally, step-by-step—yet the associated co-ordination dilemmas keep proving insuperable.
The outline Iran nuclear deal has highlighted divisions in the region—not just between majority Shia and Sunni states but between those supporting the status quo and those challenging it.
The Conservative-led government of austerity Britain is facing the sacrifice of its sacred cow of high military spending—to preserve the even more precious elephant in the room: the UK’s ‘independent’ nuclear weapon.
The P5 process was a British attempt to spark multilateral nuclear disarmament. It should no longer be accepted as an excuse for inaction.
Continued Republican efforts to force further sanctions on Iran threaten the fragile coalition making progress on nuclear negotiations, which already show wear from an outdated zero-sum approach.
Fatalism over the chances of achieving agreement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is symptomatic of a failure that goes deeper than the inefficiencies of the diplomatic process.
The world is getting restless with some states' attachment to nuclear weapons. So why is Britain going out of its way to deepen its nuclear relationship with the United States?
Despite a renewed sense of purpose with a change in leadership and the crisis in Ukraine, the alliance continues to court its own irrelevancy.
If Scotland votes yes for independence this week, the chances of the UK having to disarm its nuclear arsenal rise dramatically–and the global non-proliferation regime needs just such a shot in the arm. But even a close no vote should be cause for reassessment over the future of Trident.
The renewal of the “independent British nuclear deterrent” has met remarkably little debate in the UK. Except in Scotland, that is.
What will it take for negotiating parties to reach a lasting deal over Iran's nuclear programme–and what does it mean for the non-proliferation regime?
