Why is it that unlike other European countries, Germany has not had a long-lasting populist party. Though some contemporary German parties have ‘populist affinities and tendencies’, these are short-lived tactics used to win votes, and often associated with political scandal.
Kanak Attak in Germany is an anti-racist collective of people with mixed ethnic backgrounds who aim to turn the dominant discourse on migration upside down. They invite us to consider the role of intellectuals in migration regimes.
In the last two decades gendered and sexual ‘others’ have been ‘included’ in citizenship, as new sexual rights–bearing subjects. To what extent is this a Euro-American configuration within political liberalism? How do colonial and orientalist ideas about democracy follow from this restricted notio
Hesitation as a means of coercion – that is Merkiavelli’s method. Only one fate is worse than being overwhelmed by German money and that is not being overwhelmed by German money. Power grounded in the economy has no need to invade and yet is ubiquitous.
The majority of Germans view the United States, the “land of unlimited opportunities”, with a lot of sympathy. But their perception of American politics is more problematic.
Has Poland replaced France as Germany's most trusted European partner?
The Pirate Party does not stand for certain policies, but for a new way of doing politics that challenges established notions of parliamentary democracy with new modes of decision-making.
Europe is in the crucial weeks of its epic crisis. The judgment by Germany's constitutional court returns authority to politicians in shaping a solution to the eurozone's troubles. But at a deeper level the contest for Europe's future is also about its social model, cultural resources and democrat
Until the summer of 2012 I cannot find any use of the Marshall Plan as an analogy for understanding and resolving the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The Marshall Plan had at its centre a massive sovereign debt relief programme that was particularly propitious for the new West Germany.
The historical links between Germany and Britain - aristocratic, political, industrial - are full of lost possibility. A retrace of their course suggests that one current should still be retrieved, says Christopher Harvie.
Without a mutualisation of risk, the euro will collapse, with devastating implications for German exports, the value of Germany's foreign investments, and the stability of its banking sector. By contrast, the reforms needed to stabilise the eurozone pose far fewer risks to Germany.
A Greek exit from the European single currency would not bring the catharsis that some expect. Rather, it will create new challenges that can only be met with major institutional reforms - to which Germany is central, says Simon Tilford.
