The outcome of the Greek game depends on how Syriza sees itself in two possible futures: "Exit" or "Buckle"
By reducing European solidarity to a question of rules, Germany has become a problem for the European Union.
Europe has historically been a beacon of political experimentation. Has it now become structurally unfit for change?
The complexity of the changing nation-state under the duress of globalization is currently snagged on a simplistic drive to fast-forward the past, driven by the desire to stay local.
The elephant in the recent Eurogroup meeting room was Greece's 2010 failed structural readjustment programme, admonished by Yanis Varoufakis as 'fiscal waterboarding'. Why does Germany persist in defending it?
Unless Syriza changes its rhetoric now and unless it explains the facts about the EU and the economy, it will be incapable of justifying any of these decisions to its voters several months down the line.
George Papandreou cancelling his referendum was a capitulation. Tsipras and Varoufakis achieving new space and flexibility and four months to achieve a genuinely new approach was quite an achievement.
In the lead up to the election, and especially since forming a coalition with the Independent Greeks, Syriza's rhetoric has adopted an increasingly nationalistic tone. What does this mean for discourse in Greece and anti-austerity politics in Europe?
Syriza still needs to build a strong hegemonic culture to include the non-leftist progressive movement and to expand the bloc beyond class politics to gain the consent of society at large.
Yanis Varoufakis has said that he does not intend to back down from his rather high “red lines”. European leaders, and especially German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, are currently exploring just how true that is.
The FT thinks Greece is playing chicken. In fact, it's in a dominant position.
