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Wilson, Trotsky, Assange: lessons from the history of diplomatic transparency

Bentham and Kant were clear that diplomatic secrecy was bad. So were Wilson and Trotsky. And while Wikileaks may not be the ideal organisation to take diplomatic publicity to a new level, we should embrace its challenge.

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On the 7th  of November 1917, just after the revolution, Lev Trotsky took office at  the Russian Foreign Ministry and started reading the correspondence  between his predecessors and the ministers of the other countries. The  new People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs discovered many secret  treaties with old Europe's powers aimed at exchanging rights over  colonies and re-drawing national boundaries. Official documents revealed  what the Bolsheviks had claimed since the beginning of the war: it was  not fought for patriotic reasons. From the Russian archives came strong  evidence that there was an agreement among the hegemonic classes against  thousands of Russian peasants enlisted in the army. Those sent to die  for the glory of Holy Mother Russia were actually sold by their Tsar to  the highest bidder. In a word, it confirmed the validity of one of  Lenin’s simplest demands: a peace treaty had to be signed as soon as  possible and without annexations or reparations.

Trotsky,  a polyglot intellectual who was already widely traveled did not  hesitate in deciding what to do: the Foreign Ministry's archives had to  be made public in order to make the whole world aware that the war in  Europe was fought by the hegemonic classes against their own peoples.  Secret diplomacy was just the make-up needed to hide this fact: “Secret  diplomacy is a necessary tool for a propertied minority which is  compelled to deceive the majority in order to subject it to its  interests”, declared Trotsky, only two weeks after the conquest of the Winter Palace.

Thanks  also to the megaphone of political forces sympathizing with the new  Bolshevik government the secret documents had a remarkable distribution  thoughout Europe. Nevertheless, the major impact occurred in the United  States. American President Woodrow Wilson became somehow an early  Trotskyist by repeating in the first of his Fourteen points, released just two months after the Russian revolution, the principle of diplomatic activities' publicity: “Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view”. The  communist and atheist Trotsky together with the liberal and  Presbyterian Wilson managed to dramatically change practice: from that day, the majority of international treaties have not  been secret.

It  is true that liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant,  had already at the end of the XVIII century, called for much more than  publicity of the treaties. Bentham, for example, stated that all practice of secret diplomacy should be abolished: “The  Foreign Department is the Department of all others in which the  strongest checks are needful. At the same time, thanks to the rules of  secrecy of all the Departments, this is the only one in which there are  no checks at all. I will say, then, the conclusion is demonstrated. The  principle which throws a veil of secrecy of the proceeding of the  Foreign Department of the Cabinet is pernicious in the highest degree,  pregnant with mischiefs superior to everything to which the most perfect  absence of all concealment could possibly give rise”.# Trotsky himself  just repeated the point made much earlier by Bentham when he argued that  “the abolition of secret diplomacy is the primary condition for an  honest, popular, truly democratic foreign policy”.

Today  history is repeating itself. Julian Assange is neither Trotsky nor  Wilson, and WikiLeaks is neither the Russian Bolshevik party nor the  American Democratic party. Nevertheless WikiLeaks is readdressing the  issue which was left open at the end of the First World War: is  diplomatic secret in the people's interest? Both Trotsky and Wilson  moved their agenda forward to some limited extent: the Soviet Union soon  became a harsh dictatorship and transparency was so despised under  Stalin that even the map of the Moscow underground was a classified  document. The practice of publicity had better luck in the United States  and in other Western countries. Transparency and accountability started  to be common sense in consolidated democratic regimes although state  secret still exists and diplomacy is still covered by the seven veils of  classified documents. Even in the most democratic countries, secrecy in  international affairs continues to be justified by the need to protect  the state's integrity and to guarantee citizens’ security and these aims  prevail over the need to guarantee transparency and freedom of  expression.

Through  WikiLeaks world public opinion was informed of numerous violations of  humanitarian law in Afghanistan, of false reports on the legitimacy of  the military intervention in Iraq, of the exaggeration of the weapons of  mass destruction held by Saddam Hussein. This core information has been  peppered with hundreds and hundreds of more exciting but less relevant  gossip about political celebrities. Not surprisingly, those holding the  secrets have reacted furiously against the leaks, have made what efforts  they can to prevent further leaks and threatened retaliation against  those who provided the information, those who published it and even  those who dared to read it. The prize for the most furious reaction goes to Congressman Peter King, who wanted WikiLeaks to be declared a foreign terrorist organization. These  reactions are certainly comprehensible but not justified. If there is  the need to fight a war, the citizens, the taxpayers and even more the  conscripted should clearly know the reasons for spilling blood on the  battleground. Otherwise, as Noam Chomsky correctly pointed out, “government secrecy is to protect the government from its own population”.

Until  now WikLleaks' revelations have not provoked major damage to  intelligence mechanisms, either in Afghanistan or anywhere else. It may  always be that such revelations can harm and identify specific persons,  making their actions and their information services known to malicious  people. Excessive transparency can in principle be dangerous for a few  individuals, and it should be balanced with the need to protect the  privacy of individuals. At the expense of violating the privacy of many  individuals, WikiLeaks has allowed public opinion to know that public  offices have been used for private purposes, that false information has  been released with the explicit aim of diverting public attention, that  crimes have been committed without liability. Looking at the outcomes so  far produced, it can be argued that the violation of privacy has been  minimal compared to the relevance of the information provided to public  opinion.

An  instrument like WikiLeaks has proven to be helpful not only in making  governments and their officials more accountable. It has also proved  very useful to check and control the business sector. We have already  seen that WikiLeaks has started eating into banking secrecy, with the  publication of the greatest tax dodgers' lists by a banker that worked  in Cayman Islands on behalf of the Swiss bank Julius Baer. In this case,  it would be difficult to claim that confidentiality on tax evasion and  money laundering should be protected in deference of privacy. It is  somehow surprising that some Courts, rather than using the occasion to  prosecute financial crimes, have preferred to be on the side of the banks and requested that leaked documents should be removed from the public domain.

WikiLeaks  raises a more general point that needs to be addressed: is there any  effective filter between the load of information leaked out and what is  actually published? WikilLeaks today has been a pioneer and it is  carrying out an important public function, but it is probably  inappropriate that an unaccountable private organization holds so much  power. The opportunity to publish classified document has traditionally  been a prerogative of all media, but there is no media, to date, that is solely devoted to releasing classified documents. This puts  WikiLeakes in a league by its own.

The  responsibility to monitor the transparency of geopolitical relations,  of financial flows and of other sensitive information should be put in  the hands of organizations that are themselves fully transparent and  accountable. The empirical research carried out by One World Trust on  the accountability of inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental  organizations and of business corporations has often provided counter-intuitive results,  indicating that institutions such as the World Bank are more  transparent than institutions such as the WWF International.#  Paradoxically, WikiLeaks risks being an organization more secretive than  those whose documents it publishes. “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”  said Juvenal and today we can wonder: “Who will assure the transparency  of those who generate transparency?”

WikiLeaks  is denouncing a major transparency deficit in world politics. But we  need to ask if it is acceptable that a group of private citizens and a  website, even if it is well built and it has the best intention, is the  most appropriate way of protecting the public interest. Shouldn’t the  international community, governments and the groups that constitute  global civil society start to look into the possibility of developing  similar institutional mechanisms?

The  governments that are using any possible means to stop Assange should  reflect on one thing: the revolution triggered by WikiLeaks and the  algorithms that determinate its functioning are not reversible. The  state secret as we knew it is definitively dead. The main task for the  present and future is to find the appropriate mechanisms to manage  confidential information. President Wilson was brave enough to accept  Trotsky's challenge and to establish an innovative principle: the  publicity of international treaties. Is there anybody today brave enough  to accept Assange's challenge?

Daniele Archibugi

Daniele Archibugi

Daniele Archibugi is Research Director at the Italian National Research Council and Professor of Innovation, Governance and Public Policy atBirkbeck, University of London.

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